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Almost 3% of physicians who serve Medicare Part B Fee-for-Service (FFS) patients bill Medicare for services
that would take more than 100 hours per week to provide – an implausible number – in this novel and easy-to-
implement approach to detect potential overbilling based on the hours implied by actual billing codes.
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KEY FINDINGS: Almost 3% of physicians who serve Medicare Part B Fee-for-Service (FFS) patients bill Medicare for 
services that would take more than 100 hours per week to provide – an implausible number – in this novel and easy-to-
implement approach to detect potential overbilling based on the hours implied by actual billing codes.
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ophthalmologists tended to overbill the most for services. 
In terms of practice characteristics, the authors found that 
physicians in smaller provider groups and with fewer hospital 
affiliations tended to overbill. The coding patterns of these 
“flagged” physicians suggest a responsiveness to financial 
incentives: they tend to submit more higher-intensity service 
codes than their unflagged colleagues, especially when the 
marginal revenue gained from submitting mid- or high-
intensity codes is relatively high.
THE IMPLICATIONS
This quick and easy method to detect potential overbilling 
can complement existing methods of fraud detection, 
which involve comprehensive and time-consuming audit 
reviews. The authors’ proposed approach could be used as a 
screening tool to identify individual physicians, specialties 
and service codes whose billing patterns are consistent with
THE QUESTION
Overbilling for physician services under Medicare Part B has 
long been a concern, as some estimates show that fraudulent 
“upcoding” or “overcharging” might have cost the program 
tens of billions of dollars per year. Existing methods to detect 
the prevalence and financial cost of overbilling have various 
limitations, so the authors developed a novel approach: 
create estimates of actual hours worked as implied by the 
medical service codes that providers submit to Medicare. In 
an NBER working paper, LDI Senior Fellow Hanming Fang 
and co-author Qing Gong examine whether this method can 
generate a quicker and more robust estimation of overbilling 
across medical specialties and geographic areas.
THE FINDINGS
Though not definite evidence for overbilling, the study finds 
that of more than 600,000 physicians in the study, 2,300 
submitted claims for service codes that would translate into 
more than 100 hours per week on services for Medicare 
Part B FFS beneficiaries alone, despite the deliberately 
conservative estimation procedure. Six hundred physicians 
submitted claims that translate into more than 168 hours per 
week – which implies working 24 hours per day, 7 days per 
week. In examining differences between medical specialties, 
the authors found that optometrists, dermatologists and 
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overbilling that cannot be explained by observable 
characteristics. By identifying certain physicians, specialties 
and services that are more or less likely to have excess 
billing, the tool can help regulators focus their limited time 
and resources. One important limitation is that the tool can 
only flag potential overbilling for services that explicitly 
require the physician to spend time with the patient. Some 
services, such as drug infusions or medical device utilization, 
are unable to be examined for potential overbilling using the 
available data and would instead require a detailed, practice-
level audit.
THE STUDY
The authors used Medicare Part B Fee-For-Service Physician 
Utilization and Payment data, which have been released 
to the public annually since April 2014. Each report has 9 
million records showing medical claims at the physician-
service level, meaning that the data show how much a 
physician billed for a particular service for the entire year. 
The authors limited their sample to individual providers and 
used the CMS Physician Compare database to find more 
detailed information, such as group practice affiliation. To 
estimate the amount of time required for different medical 
services, the authors used the National Physician Fee 
Schedule’s listing of Relative Value Units (RVUs) as well as 
an on-site survey conducted by CMS to learn about the real 
amount of time required for 112 common medical services. 
The estimation procedure allows service time needed per 
RVU to vary by specialty, and is deliberately conservative 
in many ways to counteract the known issues of RVUs. 
The final sample had 7.9 million observations on 623,959 
physicians across 4,480 medical service codes.
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